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Abstract—The proliferation of low-power wireless communica-
tions and handheld devices has facilitated the development of 
pervasive systems for healthcare applications. This paper de-
scribes a body sensor network comprising a personal controller, 
various biosensors and actuators for pervasive healthcare. Vari-
ous physiological parameters such as heart rate or blood oxygen 
level can be continuously monitored. The growing complexity of 
such systems, however, poses challenges for system management 
and security. In this paper we present a secure autonomic body 
sensor network called Vesta which makes use of the extensible 
architecture pattern of a self managed cell (SMC). A policy-
driven management paradigm supports adaptability to contex-
tual changes by applying event-condition-action rules. Fine-
grained access control of the system is realized through authori-
zation policies. Experimental evaluation shows that it is viable 
and practical for real-world pervasive healthcare.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of miniaturized biosensors [1] and low-
power wireless communications, it has become increasingly 
practical to develop pervasive systems [2, 3] for healthcare 
applications [4, 5]. This paper focuses on a pervasive system 
that comprises biosensors, actuators, and a portable process-
ing device such as smartphone. Wearable or even implantable 
biosensors are able to continuously monitor physiological 
parameters including heart rate, body temperature and oxygen 
saturation for healthcare purposes. Body sensor networks 
simplify sensor interconnection for in-hosptial monitoring and 
enables home monitoring of patients which facilitates early 
release from hospitals and automated emergency alert. 
Healthcare practitioners can also better understand a patient’s 
condition, and limited hospital resources can be utilized more 
efficiently [2].  
However, operating such a pervasive healthcare system is 
non-trivial, as it requires considerable computing expertise to 
configure as it includes heterogeneous devices and many dif-
ferent types of software. There is also a need to reconfigure 
the system to accommodate context changes over time and 
allow easy dynamic reconfiguration of the set of sensors for a 
patient. The system therefore needs to discover the new com-
ponents and make them available to provide new services, or 
components may leave so should be cleanly removed from the 
system. To overcome these challenges, autonomic computing 
[6] can be used to enable self-configuring, self-healing, self-
optimising, and self-protection to enable autonomous system 
operation with minimal human involvement.  
For healthcare applications, data confidentiality and user 
privacy becomes an important issue, since the data may con-
tain sensitive information about a patient, particularly when 
politicians or celebrities are involved. Wireless communica-
tion enables flexible configuration but exposes security weak-
ness to an adversary. Data communication may be eaves-
dropped or an adversary may use compromised biosensors to 
join a patient’s network to access sensitive user data.  
Access control or authorization also becomes a necessity. 
For example, in a hospital environment, nurses or doctors 
often need to access resources, or even invoke operations, on 
a patient’s system. Only legitimate users should be allowed to 
interact with a patient’s system, but there is also a need to 
grant different access privileges to different users such as 
nurses, doctors, consultants etc. This is very important since 
an incorrect action may result in serious consequences.  
Considerable research has addressed autonomic computing 
issues [6]. For example, many protocols have been developed 
for service discovery, including UPnP [7], Jini [8], Bluetooth 
SDP [9] and SLP [10]. Other traditional network and system 
management techniques have also been proposed for event 
dissemination, fault diagnosis and policy-based management. 
However, they are intended for enterprise networks and thus 
are not suitable for personal healthcare systems where compu-
tational resources are usually constrained.  
In this paper, we propose a secure autonomic system called 
Vesta for managing pervasive healthcare systems. We extend 
the initial work done in the Amuse Project [3] by providing 
support for security and policy management on very simple 
biosensors. We use the Amuse Self-Managed Cell (SMC) 
architectural pattern for software components and devices 
which form a healthcare body sensor network. The SMC sup-
ports dynamic component addition and departure; interactions 
among components within a cell by making use of an event 
service. A policy service effectively implements a feedback 
control loop. Adaptation is enabled through deploying, re-
moving, enabling and disabling policies.  
Vesta incorporates a number of security measures to secure 
a self-managed cell. First, we propose a simple yet effective 
method to admit new sensors. Second, data communication 
between sensors and the controller are secured by symmetric 
cryptography that is appropriate for resource-constrained sen-
sors. Finally, to realize fine-grained access control, authoriza-
tion policies define what actions a subject can perform on a 
target when specified conditions hold. Adapter objects act as 
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proxies for remote components and can perform protocol spe-
cific adaptation. 
This paper is structured as follows. The background and a 
motivating example are presented in Section 2. The system 
overview of Vesta is described in Section 3. The following 
section details the design of several important components. 
We conducted experiments and performance results are intro-
duced in Section 5. Finally, the paper is concluded and future 
research directions are mentioned in Section 7.  
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
This section introduces the basic components of a body 
network and gives a motivating example. Although there can 
be many application scenarios, we focus on the scenario of a 
hospital ward involving patients, nurses and doctors to exem-
plify the use of pervasive healthcare systems.  
The patient’s body network is usually composed of a 
handheld device such as a PDA, smart phone or gumstix as 
the personal controller plus a number of wearable or even 
implantable wireless biosensors and actuators. Figure 1 shows 
a typical body sensor node (BSN) with connected biosensors 
developed at Imperial College London [11]. These biosensors 
continuously monitor various physiological parameters of the 
patient. For example, ECG sensors can monitor the heart 
status and accelerometers can be used to determine activities. 
A feedback control loop could incorporate an actuator such as 
a drug pump. All biosensors, actuators and the personal con-
troller communicate with each other through wireless com-
munications, such as IEEE 802.15.4 or Bluetooth. The pa-
tient’s body network is likely to evolve over time as new de-
vices may be added to monitor emerging symptoms or sensors 
no longer needed are removed.  
The configuration of the pervasive system often needs to 
adapt. New devices need to be configured when added and the 
system should be updated when devices are removed. The 
devices within the system should also be reconfigured when 
patient context changes. For example, when the patient is in 
the ward, an emergency is reported directly to a medic 
through local wireless communication such as WiFi. How-
ever, when the patient is outside of the hospital, the emer-
gency should be reported to the doctor or the emergency serv-
ices via the GPRS/3G channel of the patient’s mobile phone.  
The process of associating a biosensor to the body network 
of the patient is non-trivial and critical. In the environment of 
a hospital, there are many patient body networks. If a biosen-
sor is physically attached to one patient but associates with 
the network of a neighboring patient, the reported data would 
be incorrect and this may lead to wrong medical decisions. 
Furthermore, an adversary may intentionally try to capture 
such biosensors in an attempt to access the data of a patient.  
Wireless communication is one of the main strengths of 
pervasive computing, removing the burden of wiring different 
devices. However, it exposes security weakness. The biosen-
sors communicate with the personal controller via short-range 
radios. A patient may communicate with medics through a 
wireless channel. An adversary may eavesdrop on the com-
munications and compromise confidentiality of the data and 
hence patient privacy, particularly for prominent politicians or 
celebrities. The adversary may even launch active attacks by 
replaying or modifying messages to harm the patient.  
Patients need to interact with nurses and doctors. A nurse 
reads the sensor data on a patient on a regular basis to ensure 
the wellbeing of the patient. A doctor may look at the logged 
physiological data to determine medical treatment. It is appar-
ent that different medics have privileges of different levels. 
For example, a doctor is entitled to invoke a drug-pump op-
eration on a patient, but a nurse is not allowed to do so. This 
highlights that, on the one hand, it is necessary to authenticate 
different users, and on the other hand, access control should 
permit only legitimate users to perform authorized operations.  
Note that a nurse or doctor may also have a personal net-
work, consisting of a portable computer/smart phone and 
various kinds of additional monitoring devices to access the 
patient’s body network to perform specific tests or determine 
current state form the patient’s sensors. 
In summary, from the motivating example, we can see that 
the following functionalities are required for a pervasive 
healthcare system.  
• Autonomous management. The system must be self-
managing with little human intervention or configuration 
input and should be adaptive to context changes.  
• Access control needs to differentiate different user roles, 
and only allow legitimate users to perform authorized 
operations.  
• Data confidentiality must be ensured to minimize the 
security vulnerability of wireless communication. 
III. VESTA OVERVIEW 
In this section, we present the architecture overview of 
Vesta and describe the major components. Vesta makes use of 
the SMC architectural pattern, depicted in Figure 2 [3] to rep-
resent a Patient’s or Medic’s personal network. Vesta extends 
Amuse [3] by 1) securing the Discovery Service, 2) providing 
a new Authentication Service, and 3) including access con-
trol. For the completeness of describing the whole system, we 
introduce all of the main components in this section, and de-
scribe the design of the new components in the next section. 
The body network is by nature a distributed environment con-
taining heterogeneous components and devices. Sensor nodes 
 
Figure 1: A biosensor node consisting of a processing 
board and a pluggable sensing board, compared to the 
size of a ballpoint pen.  
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typically communicate using IEEE 802.15.4 while a smart 
phone has a Bluetooth radio. Vesta must support a unified 
view and allow all these components to interact with a unified 
interface. As management systems are usually event driven, 
Vesta  uses a publish/subscribe event bus which ensures in-
order and reliable delivery of events [12]. This decouples 
interacting components, allows multiple components to sub-
scribe to the same events, and hides communication heteroge-
neity. However, we do not insist that all interaction is via the 
event bus but also support direct invocations.  
The discovery service is responsible for discovering new 
services and devices. As discussed in the previous section, 
new biosensors may be added to a patient when new physio-
logical parameters need to be monitored. It is also used to 
discover approaching nurses and doctors. When new services 
or devices are added into the network, corresponding adapters 
are automatically created and deployed to receive and relay 
both events on the event bus and packets between the per-
sonal controller and the devices. After new services or de-
vices are admitted, the membership service continuously 
monitors the availability of these components. If a service 
leaves the system, resources like the adapters should be re-
leased. In addition, other components within the system 
should be informed of the departures so that they do not try to 
interact with components that have left. The discovery and 
admission procedure must be secure and guarantee that a 
biosensor is associated with the intended patient. The proced-
ure must be easy to operate for nurses. This requires the pro-
cedure to be simple and efficient.  
The policy service implements a policy-based management 
framework for adaptation. There are typically two types of 
policies. An obligation policy is an event-condition-action 
rule specifying the action that must be performed when the 
event occurs if the condition evaluates to be true. An authori-
zation policy specifies whether a subject is permitted to per-
form specific operations on the target if the condition holds. 
This can be used to realize access control and effectively pro-
tect resources from unauthorized access. The lightweight pol-
icy system of Ponder2 [13] is deployed for the policy service.  
A policy-based feedback loop is realized [3]. Context 
changes are indicated by events and disseminated through the 
event bus. The policy service uses these events to trigger ob-
ligation policies and if the policy condition evaluates to true, 
the corresponding policy action will be invoked. All actions 
are governed by authorization policies [14]. Before an action 
is actually performed, the policy system searches for an 
authorization policy which permits the action otherwise it is 
blocked. We also need to authenticate subjects performing an 
action on a target component and have developed an authenti-
cation protocol based on a public key infrastructure (PKI). As 
described in the next section. Adaptation is realized by load-
ing, removing, enabling and disabling policies.  
IV. DESIGN DETAILS AND ANALYSIS  
This section describes three major components which ex-
tend the SMC architecture developed in the Amuse project: 
secure sensor discovery, authentication module and access 
control. With the secure sensor discovery module, a new sen-
sor is guaranteed to be associated to the intended patient and 
only valid sensors can be admitted into the system. Wireless 
data transmission between sensors and the controller is en-
 
Figure 2. The Vesta architecture which extends the Self Managed Cell (SMC) architectural pattern. Components within the 
cell are connected through an event bus. Adapters are created for software components or devices that reside outside of the 
personal controller.  
 4 
crypted. A pairwise key is created when the sensor is admit-
ted. Interacting users can authenticate each other, and subse-
quent communications between them are kept confidential. 
Fine-grained access control to resources at the target system 
must be performed for  authenticated user. 
A. Authentication Protocol 
We developed an authentication protocol based on the pub-
lic key infrastructure (PKI). It is assumed that there is a cer-
tificate authority (CA) within the hospital, which assigns a 
public key certificate to every user. The certificate is signed 
by the CA, and encloses the public key and other attributes of 
the user, such as the name, and identification.  
The nurse controller broadcasts (e.g., through WiFi) 
HELLO messages periodically in order for patients to be 
aware of its presence. On receipt of a HELLO message from a 
new nurse, a patient initiates the mutual authentication pro-
cedure as shown in Figure 3 The protocol procedure is exem-
plified with the authentication between a nurse, Alice, and a 
patient, Bob. Bob responds to Alice’s HELLO with a REQ, 
which initiates the authentication protocol. Next, Alice sends 
her certificate Ca to Bob who checks the validity of Ca. If the 
certificate is valid, Bob sends his certificate Cb to Alice who 
also checks its validity. The exchange of Diffie-Hellman 
(DH) parameters enables generation of a pairwise key for Bob 
and Alice for a secure communication channel. On comple-
tion of DH key creation, each side has authenticated the other.  
Due to the unreliable nature of wireless communications, it 
is possible that messages may be lost or corrupted in the proc-
ess of packet exchange. Thus, it is important to ensure that no 
deadlock is introduced. To overcome this issue, a timer is 
started, at the start of the authentication protocol. When the 
timer fires, the process stops and the state is reset to INIT, i.e., 
it is now ready to start a new authentication process.  
A nurse may interact with multiple patients at the same 
time. Thus, each time the nurse discovers a new patient it 
starts a separate process for patient discovery and authentica-
tion. The resultant advantage is that different patients do not 
interference with each other during authentication.  
B. Access Control 
The Ponder2 policy system used in Vesta supports authori-
zation polices [14] and is able to resolve conflicts among 
authorization policies. In the following we explain how access 
control regulates access from authorized doctors and nurses  
In Ponder2, services and resources to be managed are rep-
resented as managed objects. An invocation from one man-
aged object to another can be regulated by an authorization 
policy – an invocation is permitted only if a policy exists to 
grant access, otherwise, this invocation is denied. Managed 
objects are grouped into domains which can be nested. A do-
main structure is created and maintained at each user, as 
shown in Figure 4. With the availability of domain structures, 
authorization policies can be flexibly specified in terms of 
domain paths instead of individual managed objects. The con-
sequent advantage is that even if individual managed object 
change, authorization policies do not have to be changed.  
To control accesses from a nurse, the patient makes use of 
the adapter that represents the nurse. An adapter is created 
and put in the domain structure upon completion of mutual 
authentication. This adapter is a managed object in the pa-
tient’s Ponder2 environment and represents the nurse.  Java 
Remote Method Invocation (RMI)  is used for interaction and 
the adapter implements a Java RMI interface, which defines 
all actions that may be invoked on the patient. On the nurse 
side, a mirror object is created, which is essentially the proxy 
of the remote adapter at the patient. To invoke operations on 
the patient, the nurse invokes operations directly on the mirror 
 
Figure 3. The mutual authentication protocol for a patient Bob and a nurse Alice. The protocol messages and their timing are 
shown. The state transition diagrams are along with the timing.  
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proxy. All requests are then forwarded to the adapter at the 
patient. The advantage of using RMI is that no proprietary 
protocol need be developed for communication between the 
patient and the nurse. The adapter then invokes the request 
operation at the target managed object on behalf of the nurse. 
This invocation can be effectively governed by authorization 
policies at the patient.  
As an example, suppose nurse Alice wants to check the 
current status of the heart sensor at patient Bob, so she enters 
a request via her user interface. This request is received by the 
mirror proxy and is forwarded to the nurse adapter at Bob. As 
a result, this request reaches the Alice adapter that immedi-
ately invokes the requested operation at the managed object of 
the heart sensor. The invocation is intercepted by the authori-
zation interpreter that checks if there is an authorization pol-
icy permitting this invocation. For example, the following 
authorization policy permits this invocation.  
auth+ /nurses/associated/ → /sensors/HRsenors/  
This policy specifies that all associated nurses are allowed to 
do any operations on hear rate sensors.  
C. Secure Sensor Discovery 
New sensors may have to be added to a hospital patient’s 
body network fairly frequently. A nurse, or a doctor, can usu-
ally be authorized to perform new sensor association. These 
new sensors must be cleared of any previous states and re-
initialized. The key challenge is to ensure secure association 
via simple mechanisms. Our secure discovery procedure 
avoids wireless interaction as this is more vulnerable to 
eavesdropping and capturing encryption keys. A newly ini-
tialized sensor node cannot easily distinguish between valid 
or unauthorized communication partners and has no encryp-
tion keys to secure communication. 
We devise a physical secure channel for admitting new 
sensors. In the prototype implementation, we have used an 
ASUS EEE PC [15] as the personal controller as shown in 
Figure 5. Two of its USB ports are used. One port is con-
nected to a BSN node acting as a gateway for IEEE 802.15.4 
wireless communication with other nodes. In essence, it for-
wards packets from the controller to the intended sensor and 
packets from sensors to the controller. The second port is 
connected to a programming board and is exclusively used as 
a secure physical channel for admitting new sensors.  
 On the personal controller of the patient, a discovery man-
ager is responsible for admitting new sensors. This manager 
monitors the activity on the admission port and accepts join-
ing requests of new sensors. The procedure of associating a 
new sensor to a patient is shown in Table 1.  
 First, the nurse who wants to associate a new sensor to a 
patient must send an association request to the target patient. 
In essence, the request is forwarded to the discovery manager 
and the requested action is to open the admission port. The 
action request is then checked against authorization policies 
to ensure that only authorized nurses or doctors can add new 
sensors to a patient. If authorized, the action results in the 
admission port being opened for a time window size w – 
 
Figure 4: The domain structures of Bob and Alice. The procedure of Alice invoking a sensor operation on Bob is illustrated.  
 
Figure 5. The prototype of a personal controller (ASUS 
EEE PC) that operates two USB sensor ports, one acting 
as a gateway to wireless biosensors and one as the se-
cure physical channel of new sensor admission.  
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determined by the practical time required for the nurse to plug 
a new sensor into the port and the sensor then to communicate 
with the controller. When the new sensor is plugged into the 
admission port on the nurse’s personal controller, it is pow-
ered up and starts functioning. Next, the sensor sends a JOIN 
message to the discovery manager via the admission port. On 
receiving this message, the discovery service is aware of the 
new sensor and admits it into the system. It prepares a pair-
wise session key and the group key. The two keys, in addition 
to other necessary information about the system, such as net-
work ID, are enclosed in a CONFIRM message sent to the 
sensor. The discovery service also creates an adapter for the 
sensor, which will later interface interactions between the 
sensor and other components within the system. After the 
sensor has received the message, it stores the information in 
its non-volatile memory such as the external flash memory.  
Then, the sensor is removed from the port and is supplied 
with its own battery. On startup, it has been associated with a 
specific controller and hence a specific patient’s network. All 
further communications to the controller is via wireless, re-
layed by the gateway. 
The admission procedure of new sensors is secure. All 
communication during the admission procedure is through the 
physical channel that is essentially the serial communication 
channel emulated by the USB port. This channel is the only 
way that a new sensor is admitted to the system. The group 
key and the pairwise key define the membership of a sensor. 
The only way to obtain the two keys is to undergo the admis-
sion procedure. Note that although the EEE PC is adopted as 
the prototype implementation, Vesta is not limited to it and 
can be implemented on any device that can host a Java virtual 
machine environment and have a host USB port. Current 
smart phones do not support host USB ports so we would 
need to develop a smart cable to emulate the host to both 
phone and connected BSN node. 
 
TABLE 1 
THE PROCEDURE FOR NEW SENSOR ADMISSION.  
Step 1: the nurse who wants to associate a new sensor 
sends an action request of new node association to the in-
tended patient; 
Step 2: the patient makes the authorization decision based 
on authorization policies. If authorizing the action, the dis-
covery manager opens a small time window w during which 
the admission port opens. 
Step 3: the new sensor is plugged into the nurse’s admission 
port; 
Step 4: the new sensor sends a JOIN message to the discov-
ery manager through the USB port; 
Step 5: the controller responds with a CONFIRM message 
which contains a pairwise key and the group key; 
Step 6: upon reception of the CONFIRM message, the sensor 
retrieves the keys and store them in non-volatile storage; 
Step 7: the new sensor is removed from the port and starts 
communication with the controller using the assigned keys; 
Step 8: the controller creates an adapter that represents the 
new sensor.  
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION 
This section discusses several implementation details. Ex-
perimental results of the performance of Vesta are presented.  
A. Data Encryption 
Wireless communications take place in two places. One is 
between the controller and biosensors, and the other between 
the patient and a nurse or doctor. To achieve data confidenti-
ality and combat passive eavesdropping, data packets should 
be encrypted before they are transmitted. To encrypt data 
transmitted between the controller and a sensor, we used the 
readily available Skipjack, implemented in TinySec [16], for 
symmetric encryption with a 160 bit key length. Skipjack is a 
block-cipher with the block size of 8 bytes. We use the Cipher 
Block Chaining (CBC) operation mode with non-repeating 
Initialisation Vector (IV). The battery level or sensor readings 
can be used as the seed of a pseudo-random number generator 
to generate the initial IV. 
For encryption of data between the patient and the nurse, 
we could use asymmetric cryptography based on public and 
private keys of each user. However, a computing device act-
ing as the personal controller typically has limited computa-
tional capability. This suggests that asymmetric cryptography 
would introduce significant latency. Therefore, a pairwise 
session key is created during the authentication process and is 
used for encryption of all data exchanged between the nurse 
and the patient.  
B. Time Stamping 
It is very important to guarantee the freshness of a deliv-
ered packet. An adversary may launch active attacks such as 
replaying previous sessions. This kind of attack may result in 
serious consequences. For example, an attacker could record 
the whole request packets from the nurse to the patient, which 
causes the pump to inject an amount of a drug. The attacker 
could send this request to the patient multiple times and hence 
endanger or kill the patient.  
The effective counter measure is to ensure the freshness of 
a request. It is assumed that the clocks of all users are syn-
chronized. Then every packet is attached with a time stamp of 
packet delivery off the source node. Note that the user data 
together with the time stamp are encrypted. Upon receiving a 
packet, the controller checks the difference between the cur-
rent time and the time stamp. If the time difference exceeds a 
predefined threshold, this packet is dropped.  
C. Performance Evaluation 
We conduct experiments to study the performance of 
Vesta. In practice, the personal controller typically has limited 
resources and low computational power. Therefore, we are 
interested in studying the performance in terms of memory 
footprint and processing times of various operations. Small 
footprint and short processing latency are desirable.  
To perform experiments and collect performance data, we 
implemented the patient and the nurse systems on two ASUS 
EEE PCs separately. An EEE PC has a 7 inch display. The 
processor adopts the Intel Celeron-M ULV 353 model that 
runs at 900 MHz. For the storage system, the PC has 512 
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DDR2 SRAM and 4G HDD-SSG permanent storage. The 
operating system is Windows XP SP2. We deploy J2SE 5 as 
the Java virtual machine environment. During experiments, 
the systems are not running other applications. The communi-
cation between the patient system and the nurse system is 
implemented in ad hoc mode using IEEE 802.11b network 
interface cards available the EEE PCs.  
On the patient system, a BSN node acts as the gateway. 
The new sensor is also a BSN node. A BSN node is equipped 
with an 8MHz TI MISP 16 bit processor. It has 2K RAM for 
data stack and 60K ROM for binary code. With a Chipcon 
CC2420 radio transceiver, it transmits data with bandwidth of 
up to 250 kbps.  
We look at the footprints of Vesta at both the patient and 
the nurse. The system takes 1.39 MB RAM on the nurse and 
1.25 MB RAM on the patient. The footprint on the nurse is 
larger than that on the patient because the system on the nurse 
embodies additional software components, such as HELLO 
broadcasting module and patient discovery module. We also 
investigate the footprint on the sensor node Which will de-
pend on the specific applications installed.  In the experiment, 
the new biosensor implements a basic function that regularly 
measures the heart rate and reports to the personal controller. 
In addition, it also deploys the modules enabling it to be se-
curely admitted into a network. The software on the biosensor 
only uses 0.82 KB RAM and 7.23 KB ROM.  
We determined the time overheads required by  primitive 
operations as listed in Table 2. From the table, we can see that 
most operations except the startup process are efficient. In our 
implementation, we have used the Ant utility tool to manage 
the software compilation and execution. Each time the user 
tries to start the system, the Ant tool checks whether any 
source files have been changed and then the system is actually 
started. This slows down the system startup process. After the 
system is mature and put into real application, this manage-
ment tool can be removed and the startup process can be 
speeded up.  
Next we compare the secure sensor association of Vesta to 
a sensor discovery protocol that we have previously proposed 
[17]. In that protocol, it is assumed that all healthcare workers 
are authorized to perform the sensor association. In addition, 
each sensor is assumed to be preloaded with a public/private 
key pair. This is a strong assumption and increases the man-
agement burden of biosensors. To ensure that the given new 
sensor is associated with the intended patient, the LEDs on 
the new sensor and the gateway sensor are required to blink in 
the same pattern. When seeing such synchronized pattern, the 
healthcare worker sends an explicit authorization message to 
the patient which will then include the new sensor. In the 
process, the sensor needs to perform decryption operations 
which are very time-consuming for resource constrained sen-
sors. As a result, the protocol developed in this paper acceler-
ates the process of secure sensor association.  
VI. RELATED WORK 
With the proliferation of wireless communication, minia-
turized sensors, and portable devices, pervasive computing 
systems have increasingly been introduced to the healthcare 
industry [4, 5]. In this paper, we focus on a small scale per-
sonal body networks within an overall pervasive system. A 
few researchers have studied issues such as Quality of Service 
(QoS) [18] and interoperability of data communications be-
tween different body sensor networks [19].  
Autonomic computing [6] is a promising paradigm to ad-
dress the complexity of large scale computer networks and 
pervasive systems. It enables self-configuring, self-healing, 
self-optimising, and self-protecting of a complex system. In 
[20], a good survey discusses existing technologies to realize 
different degrees of autonomic computing. Policy based man-
agement is a very flexible approach to adapting autonomic 
strategy as it is divorced from mechanisms and can be easily 
changed at run-time. 
As discussed previously, Amuse [3] is a management 
framework for pervasive healthcare systems. It proposes the 
self-managed cell as the architectural pattern that is applicable 
for systems at different scales. Vesta complements Amuse by 
providing a working system that integrates autonomic man-
agement and security mechanisms. 
There have been a number of papers on security issues of 
pervasive healthcare systems. In [21], concerns on user pri-
vacy raised when mobile technologies are used to communi-
cate with a body area network are identified. A method is 
proposed for device-to-device authentication where a pair of 
small devices want to communicate with each other over 
wireless networks but have no prior knowledge [22]. The idea 
is to make use of the similar acceleration data generated by 
simultaneous shaking. This method is convenient but relies on 
the existence of accelerometers. Moreover, it is still possible 
for active attackers to hack new devices.  
In summary, although much progress have been made for 
autonomic management in the aspects of discovery and adap-
tation, little work has been done for secure discovery and ac-
cess control that are suitable for resource-constrained perva-
sive systems in healthcare scenarios. Vesta fills this gap.  
TABLE 2 
TIMES REQUIRED BY DIFFERENT OPERATIONS 
Operation Host Time 
System startup  Nurse 13.6 s 
System startup Patient 13.5 s 
DH Parameters generation Nurse 110 ms 
Secret key generation Nurse 828 ms 
Secret key generation Patient 310 ms 
Signing message Nurse 125 ms 
Signing message Patient 78 ms 
Symmetric encryption Nurse 311 ms 
Symmetric encryption Patient 328 ms 
Symmetric decryption Nurse 235 ms 
Symmetric decryption Patient 198 ms 
Data encryption Biosensor 150 µs 
Data decryption Biosensor 90 µs 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In response to the increasing need for practical pervasive 
healthcare, this paper has presented a secure and autonomous 
system called Vesta that manages personal-area healthcare 
systems. Such pervasive systems are usually composed of 
various devices such as wireless biosensors. Vesta caters for 
the autonomous and adaptive requirements of these systems 
by extending the extensible SMC architectural pattern. It fea-
tures a practical and easy-to-use secure discovery mechanism 
for wireless sensors. In addition, it implements a fine-grained 
access control mechanism by making use of authorization 
policies in Ponder2.  
This paper focuses on implementation aspects of a secure 
healthcare system that is practical for real applications. The 
future work needs to integrate the BSN into an overall 
healthcare monitoring for logging and analyzing monitored 
information.  
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